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1. SUMMARY: This case invovles an across-the-board 
challenge to the Pennsylvania "Abortion Control" statute. The -
CA3 held that several of the provisions of this statute were 
unconstitutional on their face; the State appeals from some of 
------
these determinations. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: At issue is Pennsylvania's 
comprehensive "Abortion Control Act" which was due to go into 
effect in December 1982. About a month prior to its effective 
date appellees brought this §1983 action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, claiming that many of the provisions in the 
Act were unconstitutional on their face, and urging that the 
Act be stricken in its entirety. The TC refused to grant a 
preliminary injunction, except with respect to the requirement 
that a woman wait 24 hours after discussing the abortion with 
her doctor before proceeding. Appees immediately appealed; 
the CA3 stayed enforcement of the Act pending resolution of 
the appeal, and then after full argument~eld the case pending 
resolution of this Court's decisions in Planned Parenthood 
Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983}, and 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 
S.Ct. 2481 (1983}. After reargument and full briefing, the 
CA3 upheld several challenged sections of the tatute, and --------------- -~ - --·~-- ----- -
also struck down numerous provisions as facially --- ~ -··-____.../ " . - · ·---=-----~-------............. ~-------unconstitutional. --
The CA3 first addressed the question of its scope of 
review. Although noting that ordinarily the denial of a 
preliminary injunction will be reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion, the CA3 found that due to the delays in this case 
it had a well-developed factual and legal record, and 
concluded that under the circumstances the TC's discretion 
"yields to our plenary scope of review as to applicable law." 
For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps best to discuss 
each statutory provision separately. Only the State has 
appealed at present, and it has not argued that the CA3 was 
wrong as to each section declared unconstitutional, but only 
as to five in particular. I note at the outset my belief that 
the CA3's decisions in striking down at least two of the 
provisions are sufficiently questionable, and pose 
sufficiently novel questions, to warrant this Court's noting 
probable jurisdiction. Unfortunately, appellants' 
jurisdictional statement is not subject to being broken down 
question by question. On the other hand, I expect that this 
Court is not thrilled about taking a whole series of abortion 
questions once again, particularly when some of the questions 
are very similar to those presented in City of Akron and 
Ashcroft. 
(1) Reporting: Sections 3214(a) ,(b), and (h) require the 
attending physician to sign a report on every abortion, 
regardless of trimester. This report would include 14 
categories of data, including but not limited to 
identification of the physician, the facility, and the 
referring physician, agency or service; the political 
subdivision and state in which the woman resides; her age, 
race and marital status, the number of her prior pregnancies; 
the date of her last menstrual period and the probable 
gestational age of the unborn child; the type of procedure 
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performed; complications; the length and weight of the aborted 
unborn child when measurable; the "basis for any medical 
judgment that a medical emergency existed," and a viability 
report. The report does not include the woman's name or 
address. 
The CA3 struck these sections down on the ground that the 
nature and complexity of these reporting requirements were 
likely to have a significant impact on the woman's abortion 
decision. The CA3 noted that this Court had upheld "general 
recordkeeping requirements" in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80, but reasoned that in 
this statute the reports were being utilized to accomplish a 
restriction through their sheer burden. The court also 
reasoned that the reporting requirements would increase the 
cost of abortions, and that the State was required to proffer 
compelling state interests to justify the detail required. 
Judge Seitz dissented. He stated that "I do not regard 
these reports as having a legally significant impact on the 
abortion decision." He failed to see how the record keeping 
requirements were more or less than those permitted in 
Danforth, since in Danforth the Court merely noted that the 
requirements were "general." These records were "reasonably 
directed to the preservation of maternal health," and the 
majority had gone way out of its way when it suggested that 
the reporting requirements are unconstitutional because they 
will increase the costs of an abortion. In Ashcroft, the 





abortion. That exam cost $19; there is nothing in the record 
to suggest that the added burden from the record requirements 
here would approach the $19 allowed in Ashcroft • . 
(2) Informed Consent: Section 3205(a) (1) of the statute 
requires that each woman considering abortion be informed by 
her physician or physician's helper, inter alia, of the 
phsician's name, "the fact that there may be detrimental 
physical and psychological effects which are not accurately 
forseeable," and "the probable gestational age of the unborn 
child at the time the abortion is to be performed." Section 
(a) (2) requires in addition that the woman be informed of "the 
fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for 
prenatal care, child birth and neonatal care"; "the fact that 
the father is liable to assist in support of her child, even 
in instances where the father has offered to pay for the 
abortion"; and the fact that the woman has a right (but is not 
required) to review certain printed materials. Those 
materials are described in §3208 and include "geographically 
indexed materials designed to inform the woman of public and 
private agencies and services available to assist a woman 
through pregnancy, upon childbirth and while the child is 
dependent, including adoption agencies; a statement that "the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact 
[these agencies] before making a final decision about 
abortion"; and "materials designed to inform the woman of the 
probably anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
unborn child at two-week gestational periods commencing from 
- 6 -
fertilization to full term, including relevant information on 
the possibility of the unborn child's survival." 
The CA3 found that this information paralleled a similar 
informational section that was struck down in City of Akron. 
The court invoked similar concerns--the need to give the 
attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical 
judgment, and the requirement that the State avoid regulations 
designed to influence the woman's informed choice--and held 
this section unconstitutional also. The information here is 
designed not to inform of the woman's consent but "rather to 
persuade her to withhold it altogether." Akron reaffirmed 
that the physician should not be required to give a litany of 
information, but must be allowed to tailor his information to 
a given patient. Here some of the information--i.e., the name 
of the physician--was certainly objectionable, and any 
information that might not be objectionable could not be 
severed. 
Judge Seitz dissented with respect to §(a) (2). He 
believed that the government had conceded the 
unconstitutionality of §(a) (1), requiring disclosure of the 
physician's name. He believed, however, that much of the 
information required in §(a) (2) was specifically held in Akron 
to be "not objectionable." 103 S.Ct., at 2501 n. 37. Unlike 
the statute struck down in Akron, this information can be 
given by a non-physician counselor, "so the objection the 
Supreme Court had for the Akron statute does not apply here." 
-------------------------------------------~------------------
The majority had completely misread Akron in holding to the 
contrary. 
(3) Parental Consent: §3206 of the Act requires 
unemancipated minors to obtain the consent of their parents, 
or a court order, before an abortion can be performed. The 
CA3, although rejecting challenges to this section on equal 
protection and due process grounds and refusing to hold the 
section unconstitutional on its face, enjoined enforcement of 
this section pending promulgation of rules by the Pennsylvania 
Sup. Ct. that would ensure "confidentiality and dispatch." 
The court so held despite §3206(f): "[c]ourt proceedings under 
this section shall be confidential and shall be given such 
precedence over other pending matters as will insure that the 
court will reach a decision promptly and without delay in 
order to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman, but 
? 
in no case shall the court fail to rule within ' business days 
" of the date of application." 
(4) Second Physician Requirement: §3210 of the Act makes 
it a felony for a physician to perform certain abortions 
during the third trimester. §3210(c) requires any physician 
performing an abortion which does not preclude the possibility 
of the child surviving to arrange for the attendance of a 
second physician. The second physician will be in charge of 
the health of the child. Intentional violation of this 
provision constitutes a felony. The provision does not 
contain an exception for situations where the abortion is 







obtain the attendance of a second physician; however, 
§3210(a), which makes it a felony to perform an abortion of a 
viable fetus, provides a "complete defense" for an abortion 
"necessary to preserve maternal life or health." 
The CA3 struck down §3210(c) because it did not provide 
an exception to the second physician requirement for emergency 
situations. Judge Seitz dissented. He noted that this court 
discussed a very similar statute in Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct., at 
2522 and n. 8. There the Court construed another clause of 
the state statute to apply an exception for emergency 
situations. 
(5) Regulations Encouraging a Live Birth: §3210(b) of 
the Act requires a physician performing an abortion on a 
viable fetus to use the abortion method most likely to produce 
a live birth, unless that method "would produce a 
significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of 
the pregnant woman." The CA3 struck down this provision on 
the ground that this Court has said on prior occasions that 
the State's interest in a live birth is subordinated where 
procedures encouraging such a live birth will pose any greater 
health risk to the mother. Here the CA3 focused on the word 
"significantly," noting that the statute apparently would 
require the use of methods encouraging live births even where 
there was a cognizable greater possibility of adverse health 
effects on the mother. Judge Seitz concurred in this 
decision. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 400 (1979). 
- 9 -
3. CONTENTIONS: I will dispose of some preliminary 
contentions first. Appts argue that the CA3 exceeded the 
scope of its appellate review of a decision to deny a 
preliminary injunction by holding these provisions facially 
unconstitutional. Appts contend that ordinarily the scope of 
review of a denial of a preliminary injunction is whether or 
not the lower court abused its discretion; such a 
determination is based on the likelihood of success on the 
merits and a balancing of the equities; this Court has 
squarely held that an appeals court cannot declare a statute 
unconstitutional when examining a preliminary injunction 
motion. See Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 
310, 316 (1940). 
Appees respond in that any case where in ruling on a 
preliminary injunction motion the record is clear enough so 
that the appeals' court can enter a final judgment, it is in 
the interest of judicial economy for it to do so. Here, in 
light of Akron and Ashcroft, the record was clear enough that 
several of the provisions must be unconstitutional. 
Appees also argue that this Court does not have appellate 
jurisdiction because the decision below is not sufficiently 
"final." Although 28 U.S.C. §1254(2), unlike §1257 governing 
review of state court decisions, does not contain an express 
"finality" requirement, this Court has found such a 
requirement in the past. See South Carolina Electric & Gas 
Co. v. Flemming, 351 u.s. 901 (citing Slaker v. O'Conner, 278 
u.s. 188 (1929)). 
I . Appts reply that this Court has not read such a 
limitation into the certiorari jurisdiction under §1254(1), 
' 
and more recent opinions have expressed doubt concerning 
whether such finality is required for appeals under §1254(2). 
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 301-302 (1976) (per 
curiam)~ Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 u.s. 922, 927 (1975). 
The contentions of the parties on the merits will be 
dealt with in the discussion. 
4. DISCUSSION: First, with respect to scope of review, 
.,.,.. ..-:-= 
it appears that the CA3 may have jumped the gun, but unless -----·-·· ---...... 
this Court wants to take appellants' suggestion and summarily 
reverse on this ground, resolution of this question can await 
a decision on the merits. Given the CA3's clear expression 
its views in this case, it is hard to see what purpose a 
summary reversal on this ground would serve. 
Second, I also think that the question of our appellate 
jurisdiction should be reserved for argument on the merits. 
-... ---·· -·- --·-- ----.....__,._---------~-----
Ther most recent opinions of this Court suggest that the 
question is unsettled, and even if a "finality" requirement 
could be implied into §1254(2) it still would be open to 
question whether exceptions similar to those in Cox 
Broadcasting should also be inferred. If so, this case might 
nevertheless be sufficiently "final," given the lower court's 
express resolution of the constitutional questions. 
Turning to the merits: 
(!)Reporting: Appts argue that Judge Seitz was correct. 







that this Court has reviewed in prior opinions on abortion. 
They are reasonably related to preserving maternal health. 
Appees add nothing to the CA3 discussion. 
I think the CA3's decision on this section is highly 
questionable. ------- v ~ Such reporting was approved in Danforth provided it was reasonably directed to the preservation of 
maternal health. In addition, in~shcroft this Court approved 
the pathologist's exam. It is reasonable to suspect that much 
of the information required here would be relayed to any 
pathologist undertaking one of those exams. These regulations 
do seem reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal 
health, and this Court has not spoken in any detail on this 
_____.. 
area, although its discussion in Danforth indicates some kind 
of fact-based inquiry into the burdens imposed. I recommend 
the Court note probable jurisdiction at least with respect to 
this issue. 
(2)Informed Consent: In addition to Judge Seitz' 
arguments, appts argue that much of the information concerning 
possible effects of an abortion, contained in §3205 (a) (1), is 
I 
constitutional. They contend that that section can be 
distinguished from the "p~rade of horribles" required by the 
Akron statute. 
Appees argue that the requirement of giving the 
information, viewing the information as a whole, interferes 
with the phisicians ability to treat each patient 
individually. 
- 12 -
This decision is also highly questionable. Judge Seitz 
is quite right that most of the information required in 
§(a} (2} was noted to be "not objectionable" in Akron footnote 
~
37. The printed information o~ was not even required to 
be given, but the court struck that section down anyway. In 
addition, some of the information required by §(a} (1} seems 
quite reasonable: the state should be able to require certain 
basic medical information to be given to each patient: 
certainly it can do so as the result of a malpractice action. 
The information here is not the "parade of horribles" of the 
Akron statute. The Court should note probable jurisdiction on 
this section also. 
(3}Parental Consent: Appt contends the CA3 ignored this 
Court's holdings in Ashcroft and Bellotti that the absence of 
state court rules does not invalidate a minor consent statute, 
and that in any event Pennsylvania's guidelines are not that 
amorphous. Appee urges that this Court does not have 
appellate jurisdiction over this issue, because the CA3 did 
not hold this section unconstitutional, but merely enjoined 
its enforcement pending action by the state supreme court. 
This decision is also questionable. The statute would 
'------
seem to satisfy this Court's prior decisions. In addition, I 
think we have appellate jurisdiction. Although the court did 
not hold the statute facially unconstitutional, if it did not 
hold the statute unconstitutional in its present state it is 
hard to see why it enjoined its enforcement. This situation, 
of course, would best have been dealt with through 
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certification to the state courts, if avai~able, or 
abstention, but since those two words do not appear anywhere 
in the papers I assume they were not raised by appt and are 
not at issue here. 
Since there are some issues that this Court probably will 
take in this case, it may as well take this one also. 
(4)Second Physician Requirement: Appt says that this 
section, construed in light of the exception in §3210(a) for 
medical emergencies, is constitutional under the reasoning of 
the majority in Ashcroft. 
Again, this problem, because it involves a construction 
of the relationship between two sections of a state statute, 
would best have been solved through certification or 
abstention, and without an authoritative state law decision 
this issue is really up in the air. It is not clear whether 
the language of §3210(c) was intended to be qualified by the 
language of §3210(a). The Court may wish to address this 
question merely to explain that certification or abstention 
was the best course. 
(S)Regulations Encouraging a Live Birth: Appts state 
that with respect to the requirement that methods for 
preserving the life of a viable fetus be undertaken absent a 
"substantial" effect on the mother's health, the TC construed 
the statute to preserve its constitutionality, but the CA3 
rejected this construction. They argue that the CA3 should 
have construed the statute to preserve its constitutionality. 
- 14 -
I tend to think that this decision was correct. Again, 
appts apparently foreclosed the opportunity for an 
authoritative state court construction. This decision is a 
candidate for summary affirmance, if the Court wishes to note 
• only on specific sections of the statute. 
(5) Conclusion: In sum, I think the Court should reserve 
any procedural or jurisdictional problems for argument. I 
b 1 • th t th 1 I d • • h@ • e 1eve a e ower court s ec1s1ons on t e report1ng 
requirements and t~nfor~d conse~ requirements ar ; highly 
-------
questionable, and involve areas where this Court has not 
spoken clearly e nough so that the decisions can be summarily 
affirmed or reversed. Since the Court probably should note 
probable jurisdiction on those issues, it may wish to note 
probable jurisdiction on the parental consent and second 
~ 
physician requirements as well. 
I recommend note probable jurisdiction .• 
There is a response, and a reply. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
RICHARD THORNBURGH ET AL. v. AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND 
GYNECOLOGISTS ET AL. 
~OM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
- -- FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 84-495. Decided January-, 1985 
PER CURIAM. 
Appellants, seven State and local governmental officials 
from Pennsylvania, have invoked this Court's jurisdiction 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), 1 seeking review of a judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2 
which directed the District Court to enter a preliminary in-
junction against enforcement of various provisions of Penn-
sylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 







the Court of Appeals is not final, it is not entirely clear that //7 _,_....., ~. ~ -d .. I 
we have jurisdiction under § 1254(2). 3 Even assuming that / __,- ~ 
jurisdiction exists under§ 1254(2), however, in the particular ~ vi.-
1 Section 1254(2) provides: {/ . 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by ~ /...-f · 
the following methods: · 
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of 
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of 
the United States, but such appeal shall shall preclude review by writ of 
certiorari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on appeal shall 
be restricted to the Federal questions presented." 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). 
2 737 F. 2d 283 (1984) (appendix contains relevant sections of the Act). 
8 See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 927 (1975); City of El 
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 501-503 (1965); South Carolina Electric 
and Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901, 901 (1956) (per curiam); Slaker 
v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188, 189-190 (1929) (interpreting predecessor to 
§ 1254(2)). But see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 301-302 (1976) 
(per curiam); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 57"U:""S. 17, 82-
(1958). 
2 THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN. 
circumstances of this case the policies disfavoring piecemeal 
appellate review and premature adjudication of constitutional 
questions persuade us that the appeal should be dismissed. 
See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 
U. S. 549, 565-575 (1947); cf. Minnick v. California Depart-
ment of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105, 127 (1981); New Orleans 
v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 302 (1976) (per curiam). 
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act (the Act) was 
signed by the Governor on June 11, 1982, and scheduled to 
become effective on December 8, 1982. On October 2, 1982, 
appellees, including various medical professionals and abor-
tion providers, commenced this action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seek-
ing to enjoin enforcement of the entire Act. On October 29, 
1982, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. At 
the request of the District Court and "solely for the purpose 
of the motion for preliminary injunction,"• the parties 
entered into a stipulation of uncontested facts. Relying pri-
marily on the Court of Appeals decisions in Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F. 2d 1.198 
(CA6 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462 U. S. 416 
(1983), and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 655 
F. 2d 848 (CA8 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462 
U. S. 476 (1983), the District Court concluded that, with one 
exception, the appellees were not entitled to preliminary in-
junctive relief. See 552 F. Supp. 791 (ED Pa. 1982). 
Appellees immediately appealed the denial of the prelimi-
nary injunction, and the appellants cross-appealed with re-
spect to the one provision that the District Court had held 
invalid. On December 9, 1982, the Court of Appeals granted 
appellees' motion for a stay of enforcement of the entire Act 
pending appeal. Mter oral argument, the Court of Appeals 
decided to postpone its decision until after this Court decided 
the Akron, Ashcroft, and Sirrwpoulos cases which were then 
• 552 F. Supp. 791, 794 n. 1 (ED Pa. 1982). 
THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN. 3 
pending in this Court. 5 Following our decision in those 
cases on June 15, 1983, the Court of Appeals ordered re-
argument and, on May 31, 1984, handed down its opinion. 
737 F. 2d 283 (CA3 1984). The Court refused to hold the en-
tire Act unconstitutional, 6 but held that certain provisions of 
the Act were invalid in the light of our rulings in Akron, 
Ashcroft, and Simopoulos, 1 and that the validity of other 
provisions might be affected by evidence adduced at trial, 8 or 
by the adoption of appropriate procedural rules by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. 9 
In their jurisdictional statement in this Court, the appel-
lants ask us to hold that the Court of Appeals committed 
procedural error by holding any portion of the Act uncon-
stitutional upon review of an order entered on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The appellants also contend that 
some of the Court of Appeals' substantive rulings were 
erroneous. 10 
With respect to the asserted procedural error, we agree 
that correct practice normally limits the scope of appellate 
review of such orders to the question whether the District 
6 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 
U. S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 
476 (1983); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983). 
8 737 F . 2d, at 292. 
7 For example, the Court of Appeals held the 24-hour waiting period re-
quired by §§ 3205(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, and the hospital requirement in 
§ 3209 invalid. 737 F. 2d, at 293. 
8 See 737 F . 2d, at 299-300 (refusing to hold § 3210(a) invalid on its face 
because of the inadequate record). 
' See the discussion of § 3206, the parental or judicial consent require-
ment for minors. 737 F. 2d, at 296-297. 
10 Two questions are presented in the jurisdictional statement: 
"1. Whether a court of appeals properly may declare provisions of state 
law unconstitutional on appeal from a district court's disposition of a motion 
for preliminary injunction. 
''2. Whether the court of appeals misapplied the precedents of this Court 
in declaring unconstitutional numerous provisions of Pennsylvania's Abor-
tion Control Act." Juris. Statement i. 
4 THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN. 
Court abused its discretion in deciding that there was, or was 
not, irreparable harm and a probability that the plaintiffs 
would succeed on the merits. See Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931-932 (1975); Mayo v. Lakeland High-
lands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310, 316 (1940). Situations, 
however, may occasionally arise where the answer to a ques-
tion of law is sufficiently plain that, in the interest of judicial 
economy, it may be categorically resolved upon review of a 
preliminary injunction. In this case, for example, the appel-
lants themselves have conceded that the hospital require-
ment in § 3209 is invalid, 11 and there is no reason why the 
Court of Appeals should not have accepted that concession. 
Nor is there any reason why the Court of Appeals could not 
have noted the applicability of our then recent opinions in 
Akron, Ashcroft and Simopoulos in deciding the questions 
presented. Even if the Court of Appeals erred in its dispo-
sition of any issues, "the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not 
binding at trial on the merits." University of Texas v. 
Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981). Any errors in the fi-
nal judgment may be corrected upon review in this Court or 
the Court of Appeals. 
With respect to appellants' substantive contentions, we 
note that they embrace a number of different statutory provi-
sions, and that appellants themselves suggest that review of 
some provisions would be premature "at this time." Juris. 
Statement 4 n. 3. Thus, they do not now ask us to review 
the Court of Appeals' holding of invalidity with respect to 
either the regulation of health and disability insurance in 
§ 3215(e) of the Act, or the 24-hour waiting period in § 3205,12 
but they have preserved their objections to both rulings and 
state that they desire to offer evidence concerning the latter 
at trial. 13 
11 See 737 F. 2d, at 293. 
11 See Juris. Statement 4 n. 3; id., at 23 n. 14. 
18 See Juris. Statement 22 n. 13. 
THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN. 5 
Appellants object to the Court of Appeals' ruling on the de-
tailed reporting requirements in § 3214(a), (b), and (h) con-
tending that the magnitude of any increase in the cost of 
abortions caused by those provisions is merely speculative. 
Juris. Statement 18-20. For the purpose of the preliminary 
injunction ruling, however, the appellants had stipulated that 
the reporting requirements would increase such costs. 14 
Given that stipulation, plus the detailed description by the 
Court of Appeals, 15 it seems apparent that appellants' conten-
tion on this matter can be addressed more effectively after a 
trial on the merits at which they may offer whatever proof 
they deem relevant. The appellants other specific objections 
concern the proper interpretation of certain sections of the 
Act, 16 questions of severability, 17 and the significance of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to adopt rules govern-
ing the procedure for obtaining judicial consent to the abor-
14 737 F. 2d, at 302 (referring to Stipulation ~ 194). 
16 "§ 3214: Reporting. 
"Ths section of the Act requires in (a), (b), and (h) detailed reporting 
with regard to each abortion performed irrespective of the state of preg-
nancy. The physician must sign a report to be filed the following month, 
which includes fourteen categories of data, including but not limited to 
identification of the physician, facility, and referring physician, agency or 
service; the political subdivision and state in which the woman resides; her 
age, race and marital status; the number of her prior pregnancies; the date 
of her last menstrual period and probable gestational age of the unborn 
child; the type of procedure performed; complications; the 'length and 
weight of the aborted unborn child when measurable'; the '[b]asis for any 
medical judgment that a medical emergency existed,' the viability report 
referred to in section 3211(a), and the method of payment for the abortion. 
Another detailed report must be filed by the physician as to each woman 
who has 'complications' from an abortion or attempted abortion." 737 F. 
2d, at 301-302 (quoting statute). 
16 For example, the Court of Appeals interpreted the scope of the medi-
cal emergency exception to the second physician requirement for a post-
viability abortion in light of its view of the inter-relationship of§§ 3210(a), 
(b), (c) and 3203. See 737 F. 2d, at 300-301. 
17 See, e. g., 737 F. 2d, at 296 (discussing informed consent requirements 
in § 3205(a)). 
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tion of a minor, 18 rather than the Court of Appeals' under-
standing of the governing constitutional principles applicable 
to these sections of the Act. On matters of this kind, we 
normally defer to the Court of Appeals' understanding of 
state law and practice. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 
345-346 (1976). 
Because the factual stipulation was made solely for the 
purpose of the preliminary injunction ruling, because it was 
prepared prior to our decisions in Akron, Ashcroft, and 
Simopoulos, and because appellants themselves desire tore-
serve some of their challenges to the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment until after a full trial on the merits, we consider it 
especially inappropriate to address the merits of appellants' 
constitutional contentions at this stage of the litigation. We 
also note that appellants do not assert that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is in conflict with any decision rendered 
after our opinions were announced in the Akron, Ashcroft, 
and Simopoulos cases. 
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and, treating the ju-
risdictional statement~ertiorari, the petition 
is denied. 
IB737 F. 2d, at 297. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,ju.pr-tmt <!Jltltrl!tf tlrt ~tb ,jtaUs 
-a.sqinghnt. ~- cq. 2llbi,.~ 
January 10, 1985 
Re: No. 84-495 Thornburg v. American College, Et Al. 
Dear John, 
It seems to me that the reasons you state in your Per 
Curiam for dismissing the appeal in this case are not ----
reasons which fall within any of the traditional c~egories 
under which we have dismissed appeals in the past: "not a 
proper appeal," jKno jurisdiction" and the like. The 
"policies disfavoring piecemeal appellate review and 
premature adjudication of constitutional question" to which 
you refer on page 2 of the Per Curiam are supported by 
citations to an appeal from-a-state court which was 
dismissed for lack of a substantial record, Rescue Army v. 
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, a writ of 
certiorari to a state court which was dismissed, Minnick v. 
California Department of Corrections, 452 u.s. la5i and an 
appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Fifth Circuit which 
was decided on the merits, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 u.s. 
297 (1976). Whatever may be the JUrisprudential 
considerations that counsel against piecemeal review or 
avoidance of constitutional questions, I would think that 
n 
Congress has finally answered this question ·when it gave 
these particular appellants the right to appeal under 





cc: The Conference 
dro 03/26/85 
MEMORANDUM 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologinsts, No. 84-495. ( ~~ ~ _ ~ 
Ch-f- ? ~ '.s ~~ ~~ 
JUSTICE STEVENS has circulated a draft per curiam in 
this case which would dismiss the appeal. No other justice has 
joined it. As JUSTICE STEVENS indicates, it is not clear whether 
~
the Court has jurisdiction to review preliminary injunctions in 
cases like this. Uncertainty, however, is more reason to post-
~ 
pone jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits than reason to dis-
miss. The cases on page 2 that JUSTICE STEVENS cites for the 
proposition that policies disfavoring piecemeal review further 
counsel dismissal in the case are, as JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests 
in his memo of Jan. 10, distinguishable. 
I am hesitant to recommend that you join JUSTICE STE-
VENS'S opinion as your Conference notes indicate you thought you 
might. As my original annotations to the cert pool memo suggest, 
neither of the other courses is totally satisfactory either. As 
it stands now, though, there are four votes to postpone jurisdic-
tion to the merits and I am not quite sure what difference your 
~
vote will make. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
RICHARD THORNBURGH ET AL. v. AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND 
GYNECOLOGISTS ET AL. 
1-o~ 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (J • / ~ 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT -...)' ~ 
No. 84-495. Decided April-, 1985 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
28 U. S. C. 1254 provides: 
"Cases in the Courts of Appeals may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court by the following methods: 
(1) By writ of certiorari . . . . 
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a state statute 
held by a Court of Appeals to be invalid as repugnant to 
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States 
" 
Notwithstanding this clear directive from Congress that 
we review "by appeal" a decision of a Court of Appeals that 
holds a state statute to be violative of the Constitution, the 
Court today attempts to convert this congressional directive 
into nothing more than an allowance of discretionary review 
by writ of certiorari. Many students of the subject have 
urged Congress to repeal this Court's "mandatory jurisdic-
tion," but they have thus far been unsuccessful; I do not be-
lieve that it is within the province of this Court to accomplish 
by indirection that which Congress has thus far refused to do. 
There can be no doubt that this case properly qualifies for 
appellate jurisdiction under § 1254(2), inasmuch as the Court 
of Appeals squarely held, on the basis of the record before it, 
that several provisions of the Pennsylvania statute violate 
the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court states 
that "in the particular circumstances of this case the policies 
disfavoring piecemeal appellate review and premature ad-
judication of constitutional questions persuade us that the ap-
J L-t ~ kce (2 e~\1\(r-tl~ 1- foi lt{5 ov0 ~ pvvLit=>IM.5 w ~fl. T<-ts~-ce 
5+-eueq~ 5 proposeJ e· C'::.f':·aw- . ~fpc,re.,.-ft I~ cw s-tLI ~' vvfe; 
Ll-!J+e "'" ~ W11 Q ~'> ~£.·~"''] ~·> L ,.J- -fi ke-ep fi,e~A-t _grJ11. _ C\ 
it:~4ovdJ WL~V!o ~ ctt~~:Je "tb L-f{)ur pvs, f.\et; , ~ 
2 THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OB. & GYN. 
peal should be dismissed." Ante, at 2. The cases that the 
Court cites for this proposition singularly fail to support it. 
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 
549 (1947), was an appeal from a state court, which was dis-
missed after argument because of the highly abstract and 
speculative nature of the constitutional questions presented. 
Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452 U.S. 
105 (1981), was a case that came here by writ of certiorari 
and was dismissed after argument for want of a final judg-
ment. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976), was de-
cided on the merits after argument. None of them remotely 
supports the action that the Court takes in the present case. 
At the close of its opinion, the Court states that "appellants 
do not assert that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with any decision rendered after our opinions were 
announced in the Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulous cases." 
This, of course, under our Rules is an entirely sound basis for 
denying certiorari, but has nothing at all to do with whether 
we will hear an appeal. Before today, when an appeal is 
concededly within a jurisdictional statute such as 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1254(2), we have either heard oral argument and decided it 
by written opinion, or summarily affirmed the decision of the 
District Court. There can be no doubt that this Court has 
been sharply divided in the most recent round of cases involv-
ing the constitutional limitations upon the state's authority 
to regulate abortions. But unwillingness to face additional 
cases in this area when presented under jurisdictional stat-
utes that clearly require us to hear the contentions asserted 
is scarcely an appropriate method for avoiding what may be 
additional contentiousness and division. 
I would note probable jurisdiction over this appeal. 
~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.prtntt ~curt .ttf tltt JnUtb ~tatt,&' 
'~lhudtington,~. ~. 21l~,.~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
April 10, 1985 
No. 84-495 Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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AllSENT NOT VOTING 
CHAMBERS OF June 3, 1985 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dearest Molly: 
It was great to visit with you on the telephone yester-
day. It turned out to be a long day, as Mother and Quincy 
missed the 6:10 ·flight . from Boston to Washington. They end-
ed up having to take a shuttle to LaGuardia and a second 
shuttle from there to Washington, arriving about 10:00 p.m •• 
Quincy will be with us for a couple of days. 
Mother was much impressed by St. Paul's - the people, 
the physical facilities and the traditions of the school. 
Jody reports that your mother was a big hit. 
At your suggestion, I have checked the Pennsylvania 
Abortion case granted for next Term and you are right that 
one of the numerous parties is Planned Parenthood of Penn-
sylvania. Although I ~o not think the views or activities 
of my daughters would disqualify me in this case, I appreci-
ate your sensitivity in preferring not to become a board 
member in Utah. 
At your suggestion, I also talked to Penny and she will 
follow your example. I add only that, as all four of you 
know, you are free - of course - to make your own judgments 
on particular issues. I do not expect you to agree with 
Mother and me anymore than I may always agree with you. I 
am not above trying, however, to help each of you "see the 
light" in national elections. 
We know, and are grateful, that our four children share 
the basic values that ate our family's inheritance over many 
generations. 
....... 
- ': ~· 
Mrs. Christopher J. Sumner 
2660 Walker Lane : · ~-
As ever, 
Salt Lake Clty, Utah .84117 
cc - Mrs. Basil T. Carmody 
9 Roslyn Road 
Richmond, Virg ini~L . 23226 




I am happy to enclose a check for $300 that, together with 
the ncreditn you mentioned, should cover your travel ex-
penses for our reunion last Thanksgiving. It is such a joy 
to have all of you with us, it is our privilege to help out 
with travel expenses. 
cc - 84-495 Thornbourgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians 
/ aml J ?/27/85 
(~ 
To: Capell, Mike, Anne, & Bill 
From: Annmarie 
Re: Cases for O.T. '85 
~ 
The Justice asked me to call to your attention to~sets of cases 
that will be argued this Term. He would like you to prepare 
"summer bench memos" on them, or at least generally get going on 
them soon. Unfortunately, these cases aren't scheduled for the 
first sitting. 
(1) The abortion cases. No. 84-49~ Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians, and No. ~~' Diamond v. Charles 
involve the constitutionality of Penn. and Illinois abortion 
statutes. The Justice voted to DWSFQ. He would like the bench 
memo on these cases to focus on the differences, if any, between 
fue statutes at issue here and those challenged in the Akron 
ordinance. Doesn't his opinion in Akron control? 
(2) Punitive damages cases. No. 84-1601, Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, involves an equa:r-protection challenge 
to an Alabama statute that provides an automatic 10% penalty of 
money judgment against an unsuccessful defendant, but no similar 
penalty against an unsuccessful plaintiff. There is also a 
constitutional challenge to the award of $3.5 million in punitive 
damages. There is a second case involving the same statute and a 
challenge to a similar huge punitive damages award, Nationwide 
msurance v. ?. The latter is on the Conference list for 
September 30,-1985, and presumably will be held for Aetna. 
m both Aetna and Nationwide, Justice Powell, as Circuit 
Justice, entered a stay of the JUdgment of the Alabama Supreme 
Court pending this Court's disposition. The Justice is extremely 
interested in the constitutionality of punitive damages, and 
would a bench memo addressing this issue in some detail. 
Dan was supposed to put together a file of materials on punitive 
damages; I haven't been able to find it, although behind Sally's 
desk there are files on the Dun & Bradstreet case. (For awhile, 
the Justice's opinion in Dun & Bradstreet was going to take up 
punitive damages.) One other place to look is Griswold's amicus 
brief in a case decided this Term, Mass. Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Russell. The Justice liked its discussion of punitive damages. 
Ginny will check with Dan when he gets to Charlottesville. In 
the meantime, someone should prepare a bench memo in the Aetna 
case and keep an eye out for the Nationwide case. 
Finally, Frank Lorson in the Clerk's Office handled the 
stay applications in both Aetna and Nationwide. He may be able 
to help you with background on these ,cases. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
~= Mr. Justice Powell Date: September 26, 1985 
From: Cabell 
No. 84-495, Richard Thornberg, et al. v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. ( Cfi~ 
Argument: Tuesday, November 5, 1985 
Questions Presented 
1. May a Court of Appeals properly declare provisions 
of state law unconstitutional on appeal from a district court's 
denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals misapply precedents of this 
Cburt in declaring unconstitutional numerous provisions of Penn-
sylvania's Abortion Control Act? 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act was enacted on 
June 11, 1982, and was scheduled to become effective in 180 days. 
m October 1982, the appellees filed their complaint. On October 
29, 1982, they filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The 
ilistrict court granted a preliminary injunction staying enforce-
ment of section 3205 of the Act (24-hour waiting period) but de-
;:::::= --\\ 
nied a ':Preliminary injunction as to the remainder of the Act. --
Both sides appealled. 
After briefing and oral argument, the Third Circuit held -
fue cases pending this Court's decisions in City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 u.s. 416 (1983), 
and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 u.s. 476 
(1983). The ~ourt of ~eals then requested additional briefing, e /71 
~ard reargument, and declared most of the challenged provisions ,.t~~ 
~
unconstitutional. -
Appeal to this Court followed. This Court stated that 
it would hear argument, but did not note jurisdiction. 
ll. DISCUSSION 
A. The Third Circuit should not have reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the statute when only the appeal of the 
preliminary injunction was before it. 
The only question properly before the Third Circuit was~ 
whether the district court erred in denying almost entirely a f> 
preliminary injunction. Neither party had requested that the 
Court of Appeals pass on the constitutionality of the challenged 
provisions. ______.., issue on such review is only whether the issu-
ance or denial of the injunction, in the light of the applicable 
standard, constituted an abuse of discretion. Doran v. Salem 
lm, Inc., 422 u.s. 922, 932 (1975); Brown v. Chote, 411 u.s. 
452, 457 (1973). 
1n Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, ~ 
316 (1940), the Court held that a state statute should not be Q 
declared unconstitutional by a district court if a preliminary ~ 
injunction is granted to the plaintiff to protect his interests .t> L 
during the ensuing litigation. "The question before [the Dis-
trict Court] was not whether the act was constitutional .•• but 
was whether the showing made raised serious questions, under the 
federal Constitution and disclosed that enforcement of the 
act, pending final hearing, would inflict irreparable damages 
t.pon the complainants." Id., at 316. 
&though it is true that the Third Circuit had a factual 
~
and legal presentation that was "unusually complete," had re-
--~~ 
~ived two sets of briefs, heard two sessions of oral argument, 
and undertook plenary review in the interest of "judicial econo- , 
C.~.LL. 
ny," Appeals jumped Although the Third ~ 
ality is not an egregious misstep by that court, if this Court 
takes this case, it may wish to signal circuit courts that this~ ~ 
case represents a rare exception and that the Court usually will 
not allow proceedings here after Courts of Appeals have undertak-
m on their own motion similar plenary review of the statute's 
constitutionality. The signal may help staunch the flow of abor-
tion cases into this Court. 
B. to review this case one wa 
The appellees argue as an initial matter that the Court 
should dismiss this appeal because the Third Circuit did not di-
rect the entry of judgment for appellees on any issue, but or-
dered further proceedings before the district court. They arg~ 
that although 28 u.s.c. § 1254(2) does not contain an express 
"finality" requirement, this Court has found such a requireme~ 
m the past. See South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 
351 u.s. 901 (1956) (citing Slaker v. O'Conner, 278 u.s. 188 
(1929)). 
The appellants counter that recent opinions have ex-
pressed doubt concerning whether such finality is required for 
9..1Ch appeals under section 1254 ( 2) • See New Or leans v. Dukes, 
ti2.7 u.s. 297, 301-302 (1976) (per curiam); Doran v. Salem Inn, 
.Inc. , 4 2 2 u.s. 9 2 2, 9 2 7 ( 19 7 5) • They argue in the alternative 
that if there is a finality requirement, this judgment is suffi-
ciently final for this Court to note appellate jurisdiction. 
In any event, the issue is not an effective barrier to 
Supreme Court review. __________..., 
----(Justice Stevens tried to preclude review~ T'i" 
.~.~ 
m this ground last spring, but no other Justice joined his per~ 
curiam). As Justice Rehnquist wrote ten years ago: 
"There is authority, questioned but never put to rest, 
that § 1254(2) is available only when review is sought 
dE a final judgment. The present appeal, however, 
seeks review of the affirmance of a preliminary injunc-
tion. We need not resolve these issues, which 
have neither been briefed nor argued, because we in anY 
erent have certiorari jurisdiction under 28 ~§ 
21 3. As we have pre 1ous y one 1n an 1 entical situ-
a"t'rnn, we dismiss the appeal and, treating the papers 
as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of certio-
rari." 
.D:>ran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 u.s. 922, 927 (1975) (citations 
omitted). 
C. The Constitutionality of the Challenged Provisions 
There are five challenges to the Third Circuit's hold-
~ 
ings. I believe all of them are controlled by this Court's prior 
cpinions, and that this Court should affirm the Third Circuit in -- -----each instance. 
(1) Parental Consent or Judicial Approval. Section J ~.Zt>/. 
~06 of the Act requires unemancipated minors to obtain the con-
sent of the parents or a court order before they can undergo an 
abortion. The Third Circuit rejected challenges on equal protec-
tion and due process grounds and refused to hold the section un-
constitutional on its face. The court did enjoin enforcement of 
this section pending promulgation of rules by the Pennsylvania 
fupreme Court that would ensure "confidentiality and dispatch." 
In November 1984, after this appeal was docketed, the 
Pa-'""' 
~nnsylvania Supreme Court promulgated rules for judicial aut~or- ~~' 
t t 
ization proceedings. The rules establish a clear procedure for l'f.rf' 
- "::!! - lnJ-
the filing of a petition; there are no filing fees; the rules set cf...s'UIJ 
forth the required contents of a petition; and the rules direct ~ 
court personnel to assist the minor in preparing the petition. 
The appellees argue initial consideration of this matter should 
~ made by the district court since the parties have had no op-
portunity to develop a factual record, and the Court does not 
have the benefit of a lower court assessment of the issues. The 
appellants urge vacating the Third Circuit's judgment. 
5 3u~ 
I believe that the new rules do not save section 3206. 
ft is true that a State's interest in protecting immature minors 
will sustain a requirement of a ~onsent substitute, either paren-
l.\ 
~1 or judicial. But a State is also required to provide a]Lal-
'"' ternate procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that .......___ '" ;----;. _;_ _ _:......,::.,._;. .... _____ lllli~~~--...c,__ ..... a:~·llt!-!!!-=,...--ffie is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself 
or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 




Although the rules 
supra, at 4 3 9- 4 4 0 : Ash c r of t , supra, at 
in Ashcroft allowed the court to find 
ather (1} the minor should have majority rights for the purpose ~lo_. 
~~ 
of consent to the abortion, or (2) the abortion is in the best Ptt.... 
interest of the immature minor, Pennsylvania's rules do not pe - ~~ 
mit a court to take the second route. I therefore believe t atZ" 
~ct1on 3206 continues to be unconstitutiona~and that no fin-~ 
 
ing in the district court can save the provision because the a - ~
~ rendant rules that are facially deficient. 
(2) Informed 
L-1.. ........... 
Consent and Printed Information. Secti n ~ 
five categories of informa_t..ion that ~- 7 r-l 
-- (!:) - ~~--.;:~,., 
She must be told: unforeseen psychological 
---·~
3205 (a) (1) sets forth 
tient must receive. ------oo~s~uen_3S of abortion;~he probable gestational age of the 
fetus at the time the abortion is performed~he availability of ~~ 
(V -rredical benefits for pre- and neo-natal care; the obligatio~£ 
the father to support the child; an~er right to review certain f 
IJ ·~, 
~inted information. Relying on Akron, the Third Circuit struck / 
.. ~ 
down the prov1s1on. 
-s.a 
p II 
Here, Akron controls. Both require that a woman be in-
formed not only of the particular risks associated with the pro-
* 15/.4.~~ G"~6 ~ f.1 "" ~-M-1-~ 
~ ~~~1- ~~~~s .4 · ..._ ~-
cedure, but also of the psychological and physicial effects in-
, 
eluding hemorrhage, risks to subsequent pregnancies, and steril-
ity. Both require information concerning agencies that offer 
alternatives to abortion. Both require information about the 
fetus' probable gestational age and the availability of detailed 
information concerning the character is tics of the fetus. The 
Pennsylvania o not simply .. require that a physician 
tional?imJ?~ications of having an abortion ... Akron, supra, at 
/1.~ ;v411l-~ 
445. They insist upon recitation of a .. lengthy and inflexible 
list .. and - \' 
ffiip. Id. Section 3205 is therefore unconstitutional. (The -
requirement that the patient be told the name of the physician 
that is to perform the abortion is not objectionable, but that 
~ction is not severable from the rest of the provision.) 
The Court of Appeals also held that section 3208, order-
ing availability of certain printed materials (~ geographic 
references to public agencies, information about the probable 
matomical and physiological character is tics of the fetus) was 
inextricably intertwined with section 3205, and was similarly 
invalid. I believe this holding is correct, as there is no evi-
dence of legislative intend that section 3208 should stand alone. 
It appears, however, that if a state so chose, it could undertake 
an independent informational campaign relating to abortion. 
/( ~ 
(3) The Second Physician Requirement. Section 3210 (c) 
requires any physician performing an aborti~where there is the -1possibility of fetal surviva~\ to arrange for the attendance of a 
second physician. The second physician will be in charge of the 
,--______ 
realth of the child. The Third Circuit held that the provision 
was unconstitutional for its failure to protect the health of the 
. ~~-+.c.. A~~d ~.,.. ... ~ ~ 
rother. This Court should aff1rm L .1 ~---7 · ~ r~"'tt·u4te. ~ ,-.,.¥U ,.,""' . 
.In Ashcroft, the Court held that any second physic ian ';4.-
----------------------~~? nu~ 
requirement must have an exception for medical emergencies or a ~ 
---~""----~~~-------------------- - /.:.A 
clause that precludes "an increased risk to •the life and healtf'IU41 
cf the woman." Ashcroft, supra, at 483. The Pennsylvania stat-
ute lacks this clause. 
The appellants contend that this Court should read that 
a provisio of section 3210 (a) to cover 3210 (a) through 3210 (c)· 
~ction 3210(a) provides: "It shall be a complete defense to any 
charge brought against a physician for violating the requirement 
cf this section that he concluded in good faith, in his best med-
ical judgment that the abortion was necessary to preserve 
naternal life or health." I believe that the Court of Appeals 
was right to construe the exception to apply only to the offenses 
cutlined in section 3210(a). Section 3210 covers a separate 
class of offenses in each of its three subdivisions; the only 
rexus is "abortion after viability." There is no reason to be-
lieve that part (a) controls (b) and (c). In fact, such an in-
terpretation would make the verbatim repetition of the "offense 
... , 
definition" in each of the three subdivisions surplusage. 
(4) Regulations Encouraging a Live Birth. Section 5''32./ tJ 
3210(b) of the Act requires a physician performing an abortion_ on ---------- ~..._. ' ----- - -
a viable fetus to use the abortion method most likely to produce 
~ ~----'-~------------------------------------
a live birth, unless that method "would produce a significantly _____.... 
greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant 
w::>man." The Third Circuit struck down this provision on the 
ground that this Court has held that the State's interest in live 
a live 
birth will pose any greater health risk to the mother. 
This provision is unconstitutional for the same reason 
fuat an earlier Pennsylvania statute was found infirm in Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, 400 (i979). In Colautti, the Court .,, ... ~.>,D 
held that an earlier statute impermissibly required the 




vi val." The new Pennsylvania statute, similarly fails to require ~ 
"' -f I that maternal health be the paramount consideration. ~ 
~-
( 5) Reporting Requirements. Section 3~4 requires de- ~ 
-::::..-.. 
tailed reporting: 
---~ "The physician must sign a report to be filed the 
following month, which includes fourteen categories of 
c:hta, including but not limited to identification of 
the physician, facility, and referring physician, agen-
cy or service; the political subdivision and state in 
which the woman resides; her age, race and marital sta-
tus; the number of her prior pregnane ies; the date of 
her last menstrual period and probable gestational age 
c£ the unborn child; the type of procedures performed; 
complications; the 'length and weight of the aborted 
mborn child when measurable'; the '[b] as is for any 
medical judgment that a medical emergency existed'; the 
l::asis for a physician's determination that a fetus is 
not viable; and the method of payment for the abor-
tion." 
American College v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 301-302 (CA3 1984). 
The Court of Appeals held these requirements unconstitutional. 
V" 
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 
52 (1976), the Court upheld then unspecified reporting require-
ments as long as they were "reasonably directed to the preserva-
tion of maternal health" and "properly respect [ed] a patient's 
ronfidentiality and privacy." Id. at 80. The Court warned that 
reporting requirements would be struck down if they sought to 
cccomplish, "through the sheer burden of recordkeeping detail, 
what [the Court] has held to be an otherwise unconstitutional 
restriction." 
I believe that these reporting requirements are too de-
~iled to stand under Danforth. Although some of the information ___ __, 
.is similar to information that would be required in a census 
(age, race, "political subdivision," and state) and some of the 
mformation is reasonably related to gathering statistics on 
abortions (last menstrual period, probable gestational age, type 
d procedure performed) , the most burdensome information is also 
the least appropriate for aggregate data. It is unreasonable to 
~sume that useful statistics can be compiled from "the basis for 
oosis for the physician's determination that a medical emergency 
exists." I do not believe that the requirements are severable, 
and thus all of section 3214 must fall. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals properly determined that five pro-
visions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute unconstitutionally 
mfringed on a woman's right to an abortion: 
1. Parental Consent or Judicial Approval. The rules pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have prob-
ably corrected any constitutional infirmities. 
2. Informed Consent and Printed Information. The specified 
litany intrudes into the physician-patient relationship. 
It is indistinguishable from provisions struck down in 
~ron. The provisions providing for printed information 
are inextricably intertwined. 
3. Second Physician Requirem¥.Jl ~ · "~s require~t lacks an -/' 
- ~ 
exception for a medi"C:al emergency, and thus conflicts 
mth the implication in Akron that such provisions must 
have an exception that allows for preserva~ion of tre 
nother 's health. 
~ Regulations Encourgaging a Live Birth. These provisions ~ 
impermissibly require a doctor to make a trade-off be-
tween the woman's health and fetal survival. 
5. Reporting Requirements. Section 3214 places an unneces-
sary burden on the physician with its requirements that 
he disclose the basis for certain medical evaluations. 
'Ihese informational requests go beyond statistical ag-
~egation, which is what I believe Danforth contemplat-
ed. 
'fuis Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' finding 
that the provisions are unconstitutional. In some chambers, this 
is called striking down the statute.[~-~~ 
-----1 [ ~ tr,/•:P~ ptember 
IJWt ~ -~ 
26, 1985 Chinnis 
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No. 84-495, Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians 
No. 84-1379, Diamond v. Charles 
Jurisdiction and Standing 
You have asked whether it is possible for the Court to 
dismiss the appeals in Thorburgh and Diamond on the basis of de-
fects in jurisdiction or standing. The answer is "Yes." This 
Court can dismiss and deny both cases. There are, however, argu-
nents supporting jurisdiction and standing that you should be 
aware of. 
'IHORNBURGH 
The appellees argue that the Court should dismiss this 
appeal because the Third Circuit did not direct entry of judgment 
for the appellees on any issue, but ordered further proceedings 
before the district court. Appellants concede that the order of 
the Court of Appeals is not final, but argue that a requirement 
of finality under §1254(2) is inconsistent with the language and 
the purpose of the statute -- Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 u.s. 188 
(1929) should be overruled. Appellants suggested yesterday at 
oral argument that this Court could also grant cert if the case 
did not meet the requirements of §1254(2). 
Although §1254(2) does not contain an express "finality" 
requirement, this Court has found such a requirement in the past. 
See South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 u.s. 901 
(1956) (citing Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 u.s. 188 (1929), which 
held that "appeals to this Court from circuit courts of appeals 
lie only from final judgments or decrees," id., at 189). 
page 2. 
Appellants counter that the Court has recently called 
that requirement into question. They rely on statements from New 
Q:leans v. Dukes Power Co., 427 u.s. 297, 301-302 (1976) (Qg£ 
curiam) (citations omitted): Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 u.s. 
922, 927 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.). It is true that the Court has 
flirted with the idea of dispensing with the finality requirement 
of §1254 ( 2) in some instances. 
fut the Court has not made a statement that would confer 
appellate jurisdiction here. The Court would have to overrule 
Slaker. I believe that overruling Slaker is a bad idea: It 
would encourage piecemeal review of litigation and increase this 
Cburt's appellate docket. Moreover, overruling Slaker in an 
abortion case would have the additional deleterious effect of 
signaling the parties that this Court will take an active role in 
reviewing state abortion statutes. Finally, as Justice Brennan 
focused on in oral argument, in this litigation the finality re-
quirement seems especially important because the Court of Appeals 
rendered its decision on a stipulation of facts that is subject 
to amendment by either party on remand. It is possible -- al-
though extremely unlikely -- that such amendment could alter this 
Cbur t 's analysis (i.e. , testimony from public health officials 
~at all of the reporting requirements are necessary for the com-
pilation of essential public health statistics) . 
The alternative is to grant certiorari. In my bench 
memo, I had relied upon the availability of writ of certiorari to 
ensure jurisdiction. Justice Stevens had tried to preclude re-
view of Thor burgh last Term on jurisdictional grounds, and not 
page 3. 
one Justice expressly joined his dismissal. But if the tide has 
turned and there are not four votes to grant cert (CA3 has ren-
dered a correct decision), then the Court can and should dismiss 
and deny. 
DIAMOND 
On the mootness issue, section 6 ( 4) was enjoined from 
the day it was passed, so the controversy regarding old 6 ( 4) is 
~guably moot. Section 6(1) was in force for eight months. The 
state has promised not to prosecute anyone under this older sec-
tion. Although the possibility of bad faith from the State is 
minute, I believe that the voluntary cessation of illegal conduct 
does not moot the case for section 6(1). 
On to standing. The Illinois Attorney General has filed 
a vague letter with this Court that can be construed as either 
stating that the State has adopted the intervenors' position or 
declining to be an appellant in this proceeding. The text of the 
letter is reproduced in Appellants Reply Brief. 
Originally I thought that this letter could be read as 
the State's adoption of the intervenors' position under Rule 
10.4. Rule 10.4, however, is a measure to ensure that all par-
ties received notice of the appeal. It does not confer standing. 
Because the State has never filed a Notice of Appeal with this 
Court, it cannot be deemed an appellant. 
The question thus becomes whether the intervenors have 
standing to litigate the constitutionality of the abortion stat-
ute. It is clear to me that the intervenors do not have standing 
page 4. 
simply because they are pediatricians. The chance that infants 
who survive abortions may become his patients is too speculative. 
See Appt Reply Brief 15 n.l2. The professional and economic in-
terest in ,.ensuring that the standards of the profession are 
mintained .. is not a sufficiently concrete interest. !d. 
Appellants have suggested for the first time at oral 
~gument that the controversy over attorney's fees (an award al-
leged in excess of $100,000) confers sufficient adverseness and 
interest to present a justiciable case or controversy. The short 
answer is that there is nothing I could find in the briefs or the 
record that refers to such a controversy. Generally, the Court 
confines itself to the record in assessing material facts in the 
litigation. 
Even if there were material in the record concerning the 
alleged fee dispute, appellants still would not have standing. 
The fee dispute concerns the propriety of an award of attorney's 
fees; the constitutionality of the statute has been settled by 
the Court of Appeals. Intervenors should not be able to litigate 
that latter issue further on the basis of a collateral dispute. 
I do not believe that intervenors have standing to argue 
the constitutionality of the statute before this Court. 
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November 7, 1985 
84-495 Thornburgh v. American College 
84-1379 Diamond v. Charles 
In accord with our conversation, I have taken a 
further look - \·dth the ass.istance of my clerk, Cabell 
Chinnis - and I conclude that we have no jurisdiction in 
Thornburgh unless we want to overrule Slaker v. O'Connor. 
Nor do the intervenors in Diamond have standing. 
It would be a good thing for this Court instit.u-
tionally not to review routinely abortion cases where states 
accept the validity of our constitutional cases. In both of 
these cases, the state purports to follow our decisions. 
Where a state gets out of line egregiously, we should re-
view. Here, however, both courts below have made decisions 






November 7, 1985 
84-495 Thornburgh v. American College 
84-1479 Diamond v. Charles 
Dear Chief: 
At the time the Court took these cases, I thought 
we had jurisdiction and voted to affirm in both. 
Following the oral argument and a more careful look 
at the briefs, I have concluded that we can dismiss both, 
and this will be my vote. 
As it may be of some helo, I enclose a copy of a 
memorandum prepared by my clerk, Cabell Chinnis, following 
the arguments on yesterday. In a word, I think we would 
have to overrule Slaker v. O'Connor to take juri~diction in 
Thornburgh, and cle'irly there is no standinq by the Interve-
nors to raise the constitutional question in Diamond. 
It would be a good thing for this Court institu-
tionally not to review routinely abortion cases where states 
accept the validity of our constitutional cases. In both of 
these cases, the state purports to follow our decisions. 
Where a state gets out of line egregiously, we should re-
view. Here, ho\>Tever, both courts below have made decisions 
that will require the legislatures to reexamine the 
statutes. 





.JUSTICE w ... .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
November 12, 1985 
No. 84-495 
J 
Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians 
Dear Chief, 
Harry will try his hand at an 
opinion for the Court in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
February 6, 1986 
84-495 Thornburgh v. American College 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for the opportunt tv to have a prior look 
at the draft of your opinion. 
1y general :i.mpression is that it is excellent. I 
have one minor clarifying Auggestion. It may not be entire-
ly clear that a woman's constitutional right to make the 
abortion decision is usually unfettered only during the 
first trimester, the peri.od prior to viability. I find this 
ambiguity, for example, in the last sentence of the last 
full paragraph on page 23. It may also exist at other 
points in the opinion. 
You asked particul21rly for my opinion as to Part V. 
I agree that it is indeed "unusual" for the Solicitor Gener-
al, as an amicus curiae, to ask us to overrule major consti-
tutional decisions. I would prefer, however, for the Court 
not to critici.ze the Solicitor General specifically. My 
judgment is that even those who will applaud your decision 
will find the reaffirmation of Roe v. ~Jade that i.s implicit 
throughout your opinion and explicit on page 10 to be suffi-
cient. Also, we have already rebuffed the Solicitor General 
to some extent by denying his request to argue orally. 
The substance of what vou have said in Part V could 
be retaineif - I hope without reference specifically to the 
Solicitor General. There is at least one other amicus brief 
that urges us to overrule Roe v. Wade. You could omit the 
paragraph on p. 22, and commence Part V along the following 
lines: 
"Although appellants challenge the merits 
of the Third Circuit's decision so1ely on the 
ground that the Court of Appeals misapplied 
Roe v. Wade and its successors, various par-
ties appearing as amici curiae in support of 
appellants have urged us to take this occa-
sion to overrule those cases entirely. We 
decline the invitation . " 
A few stylistic changes in the last full paragraph on page 
23 would also be necessary to keep the qenerality of the 
reference to these amici curiae . 
I would like to add in closinq that I particularly 
like your reference to the fact that honorable persons can 
disagree on this issue. I also think vour paragraph that 
begins near the bottom of. page 23 - your final substanti.ve 
paragraph - is excellent . 
Again, my thanks for the opportunity of prior re-







Constitutional rights do not always have easily 
ascertainable boundaries, and controversy over the meaning of our 
Nation's most majestic guarantees frequently has been turbulent. 
As judges, however, we are sworn to uphold the law even when its 
content gives rise to bitter dispute. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
u.s. 1 (1958). We recognized at the very beginning of our 
opinion in Roe, 410 u.s., at 116, that abortion raises moral and 
spiritual questions over which honorable persons can disagree 
sincerely and profoundly. But those disagreements did not then 10 
and do not now relieve us of our duty to apply the Constitution 
faithfully. 
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution 
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual 
liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government. 
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 u.s. 
678 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494 (1977); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965): Pierce ·v. Society of Sisters, 
268 u.s. 510 (1925): Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390 (1923). See 20 
also Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 598-600 (1977). That promise 
extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are more 
personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to 
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision--with 
the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in 
Roe--whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that 
choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, 
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of 
liberty that our law guarantees equally to all. 
The Court of Appeals correctly invalidated the specified 30 
provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act. Its 
judgment is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
CHAMeE:RS 01'" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Personal 
Re: Amer. Colle e of Obstetricians 
Dear Bi 
een in communication with John by telephone several 
times this weekend. As you know, he had some reservations about 
Part V in its original form. Lewis shared some of those reser-
vations. 
I now enclose a 
John's full approval. 
tions about it which, 
posed opinion will go 





rev1s1on of Part V which, I believe, has 
Actually, he made some positive sugges-
I think, have strengthened it. The pro-
to the Duplicating Unit today with Part V 
much appreciate the assistance all of you 
Sincerely, 
. . ' . .. 
·' . 
CHAMI!IERS Of' 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
February 11, 1986 
No. 84-495 
Thornburgh, et al. v. American 
College of Obstetricians 
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CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§nprtntt (ijoud of tltt ~b ,jtatte 
11Jaefringt.on, ~. <ij. 2ll~J!.~ 
February 12, 1986 
Re: No. 84-495-Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
FP.hruary 12, 19B6 
84-495 Thornbut'qh v. American College 
Dear Ha.rry: 
Please join me. 
,Just ice Blackmun 
lfp/'3S 
cc: The Conference 
~incerely, 
CH.O.MBER S OF" 
..JUSTIC E ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
i'up'-r.tuu <!f&tltrl £tf Hr.t ~nil.tb .i'tatt• 
·~lht6J{itqlbtn. ~. <If. 2llc?"-' 
February 12, 986 
Re: 84-495 - Thornburg v. American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
et al. 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
From: Justice Blackmun 
_________, 
RICHARD THORNBURGH, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS 
AND GYNECOLOGISTS ET AL. 
~~  ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 ...,.-/ILL-- ....AA FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT . 
, . _ L _. bAJ P1 l"lMA---( CT r~ · 
~}-~~ F~~~~~~' 
~ JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
~~ This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States 
~ /-  Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewing the District 
· Court's rulings upon a motion for a preliminary injunction. 
~ ~ ~ The Court of Appeals held unconstitutional several provi-
~ ~ · sions of Pennsylvania's current Abortion Control Act, 1982 
Pa. Laws, Act No. 138, now codified as 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3201 et seq. (1983) (Act). 1 Among the provisions ruled 
invalid by the Court of Appeals were portions of§ 3205, relat-
ing to "informed consent"; § 3208, concerning "printed in-
formation"; §§ 3210(b) and (c), having to do with postviability 
abortions; and § 3211(a) and §§ 3214(a) and (h), regarding re-
porting requirements. 2 
1 The District Court had held invalid and had enjoined preliminarily only 
the requirement of § 3205(a)(2) that at least 24 hours must elapse between 
a woman's receipt of specified information and the performance of her abor-
tion. 552 F . Supp. 791, 797-798, 811 (ED Pa. 1982). 
2 The Court of Appeals also held § 3215(e) invalid. That section re-
quires health-care insurers to make available, at a lesser premium, policies 
expressly excluding coverage "for abortion services not necessary to avert 
the death of the woman or to terminate pregnancies caused by rape or in-
cest." This ruling on § 3215(e) is not before us. 
IO l v:u;-L~ 
2 3 5 .., ---..,,' 
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I 
The Abortion Control Act was approved by the Governor 
of the Commonwealth on June 11, 1982. By its own terms, 
however, see § 7 of the Act, it was to become effective only 
180 days thereafter, that is, on the following December 8. It 
had been offered as an amendment to a pending bill to regu-
late paramilitary training. 
The 1982 Act was not the Commonwealth's first attempt, 
after this Court's 1973 decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, to impose abortion re-
straints. The State's first post-1973 Abortion Control Act, 
1974 Pa. Laws, Act No. 209, was passed in 1974 over the 
Governor's veto. After extensive litigation, various provi-
sions of the 1974 statute were ruled unconstitutional, includ-
ing those relating to spousal or parental consent, to the 
choice of procedure for a postviability abortion, and to the 
proscription of abortion advertisements. See Planned Par-
enthoo:JyAssn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (ED Pa. 
1975), summarily aff'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzger-
ald, 428 U. S. 901 (1976), and summarily vacated in part, and 
remanded, sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U. S. 901 (1976), 
modified on remand (No. 74-2440) (ED Pa. 1977), aff'd sub 
nom. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 (1979). See also 
Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (MD Pa. 1975). 
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Legislature attempted to re-
strict access to abortion by limiting medical-assistance fund-
ing for the procedure. 1978 Pa. Laws, Act No. 16A (pp. 
1506-1507) and Act No. 148. This effort, too, was success-
fully challenged in federal court, Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 
487 (ED Pa. 1978), and that judgment was affirmed by the · 
Third Circuit. 623 F. 2d 829 (1980). 
In 1981, abortion legislation was proposed in the Pennsyl-
vania House as an amendment to a pending Senate bill to out-
law "tough-guy competitions." 3 The suggested amend-
3 A "tough guy competition" is a physical contact bout between persons 
who lack professional experience and who attempt to render each other un-
conscious. See Note, 87 Dick. L. Rev. 373, 382, n. 84 (1983). 
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ment, aimed at limiting abortions, was patterned after a 
model statute deve ed b a Chica o-bas.ediiOilrofit antl-
abort~on. See Note, Toward Constitutional 
AbortiOn Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Approach, 
87 Dick. L. Rev. 373, 382, n. 84 (1983). The bill underwent 
further change in the legislative process but, when passed, 
was vetoed by the Governor. See 737 F. 2d 283, 288-289 
(CA3 1984). Finally, the 1982 Act was formul ted, enacted, 
an~ed. 
Aft~!:J~.s~Act, b~ate, 
the p:r:_esent litig_ation was instituted in the United States Dis-
trict C'OUrtf'Or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The 
plaintiffs, who are the appellees here, were the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Pennsylvania 
Section; certain physicians licensed in Pennsylvania; clergy-
men; an individual who purchases from a Pennsylvania in-
surer health-care and disability insurance extending to abor-
tions; and Pennsylvania abortion counselors and providers. 
Alleging that the Act violated the United States Constitu-
tion, the plaintiffs, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief. The defendants named in the 
complaint were the Governor of the Commonwealth, other 
Commonwealth officials, and the District Attorney for Mont-
gomery County, Pa. 
The plaintiffs promptly filed a motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Forty-one affidavits accompanied the motion. 
The defendants, on their part, submitted what the Court of 
Appeals described as "an equally comprehensive opposing 
memorandum." 737 F. 2d 283, 289 (1984). The District 
Court then ordered the parties to submit a "stipulation of un-
contested facts," as authorized by local rule. The parties 
produced a stipulation "solely for purposes of a determination 
on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction," and "without 
prejudice to any party's right to controvert any facts or to 
prove any additional facts at any later proceeding in this ac-
tion." App. 9-10. 
' 
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Relying substantially on the opinions of the respective 
Courts of Appeals in~kron Center for Reproductive Health, 
Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F. 2d 1198 (CA6 1981), later aff'd 
in part and rev'd in part, 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and in 
Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcrgf_t, 655 
F. 2d 848 (CA81981), later aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 462 
U. S. 476 (1983), the District Court concluded that, with one 
exce_ption, see n. 1, supra, t e plaintiffs had failed to-eshib-
lish a likelihood of success on the m~e not 
entitleaTopreri~. 552 F-:--Supp--:-791 
(1982). -- -· -- --,. 
Appellees appealed from the denial of the preliminary in-
junction, and appellants cross-appealed with respect to the 
single statutory provision as to which the District Court had 
allowed relief. The Third Circuit then granted appellees' .:::"A 3 
motion to enjoin enforcellieiit o the en 1re ct pendmg ap-
pea . f er expe 1 e 1e n a gument, the court 
withheld judgment pending the anticipated decisions by this 
Court in '1f.kron, supra, 'lfihcroft, supra, and --8Imopoulos v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 (1981), all of 
which had been accepted for review here, had been argued, 
and were under submission. Those three cases were decided I /'\~ 
by this__Qgjlrt on June 15, 1983. ~enter ',. 1 
for Reprod~-a:rth,Tric., 462 U.S. 416; Planned Par- c:~ 
enthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 
U. S. 476; Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506. After 
reargument in light of those decisions, the QQurt of A_ppeals, 
with one . judge~rt and dissenting in part, 
ruled that various rovisions of the Act were unconstitu-
tiona . 737 . 2 283 (1 8 . ppel ants' pet1 10n for re-
heanng en bane was denied, with four judges voting to grant 
the petition. !d., at 316, 317. When a jurisdictional state-
ment was filed here, we ost oned further consideration of 
the qu~tion to the hearmg on the merits. 
-u.s.- (1985). ~
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II 
We are confronted initially with the question whether we ~-~"'HA~ ~ ? 
have appellate jurisdiction in this case. Appellants purport d ..... ...:.-=._:_:_~ 
to have taken their appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 1254(2). 4 It seems clear, and the parties appear 
to agree, see Brief for Appellants 21, that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals was n~~nary 
m~m. The court did not hold the entire Act 
unconstitutional, but ruled, instead, that some provisions 
were invalid under Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos, and 
that the validity of other provisions might depend on evi-
dence adduced at the trial, see 737 F. 2d, at 299-300, or on 
procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, see id., at 296-297. It remanded these fea-
tures of the case to the District Court. I d., at 304. 
The early cases of Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188, 
189-190 (1929), and McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665-666 
(1891), suggest that under these circumstances we may not 
have appellate jurisdiction. 5 See also South Carolina Elec-
tric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956). Although 
the authority of Slaker and South Carolina Electric has been 
questioned, the Court has found it unnecessary to put the 
issue to rest. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 
927 (1975). In some cases raising this question of the scope 
of appellate jurisdiction, the Court has found any finality re-
quirement to have been satisfied in light of the facts. See, 
e. g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 302 (1976); Chi-
cago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83 
' Section 1254 reads in pertinent part: 
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
by the following methods: 
"(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of 
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of 
the United States . . . . " 
5 Appellants ask that Slaker be overruled. See Brief for Appellants 10, 
22-25. 
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(1958). In other cases, the Court has avoided the issue by 
utilizing 28 u_,_s.__c..__ § 2103 and granting certiorari. See, 
e. g., Doran, 422 U.S., at 927; ~mons, 379 
U. S. 497, 503 (1965); see also Escambia County v. McMil-
lan, 466 U. S. 48, 50, n. 4 (1984). 
In this case, too, in light of our doubts, we take the latter \ 
course. We therefore treat appellants' jurisdictional state-
ment as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ, and move on 
to the merits. 6 
III 
Appellants assert that the Court of Appeals erred in going 
so far as to hold portions of the Act unconstitutional since the 
scope of its review of the District Court's denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction as to those sections should be limited to 
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
deciding that there were, or were riot, irreparable harin and 
a probability that the plaintiff would succeed on the ·merits. 
Such li ited review normally is a ro riate, see Doran v. 
Salem Inn, nc., 4 U. ., at 931-932; Brown v. Choate, 411 
U. S. 452, 456-457 (1973), inasmuch as the primar urpose 
of a preliminary injunction is o preserve the relative posi-
tionSOftne pa es. See mvers yo exas v. Camenisch, 
451 U.~1981). Further, the necessity for an ex-
peditious resolution often means that the injunction is issued 
on a procedure less stringent than that which prevails at the 
subsequent trial on the merits of the application for injunc-
tive relief. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal 
Assn. of Steelhaulers, 431 F. 2d 1046, 1048 (CA3 1970); see 
also Mayo .v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 
310, 316 (1940). 
This approach, however, is not inflexible. The Court on 
more than one occasion in this area has approved proceedings 
deviating from the stated norm. In Youngstown Sheet & 
6 We continue, however, to refer to the parties as appellants and appel-
lees, respectively. 
84-495-0PINION ' 
THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLL. OF OBST. & GYN. 7 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952), the District Court 
had issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary 
of Commerce from seizing the Nation's steel mills. The 
Court of Appeals stayed the injunction. This Court found 
that the case was ripe for review, despite the early stage of 
the litigation, and went on to address the merits. I d., at 
585. And in Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U. S. 518 
(1897), the District Court issued injunctions in two patent 
cases and referred them to a Master for accounting. The 
Court of Appeals reversed. This Court ruled that the Court 
of Appeals had acted properly in deciding the merits since re-
view of interlocutory appeals was designed not only to permit 
the defendant to obtain immediate relief but also in certain 
cases to save the parties the expense of further litigation. 
Id., at 525. 
The Third Circuit's decision to address the constitutional-
ity of the Pennsylvania Act finds further support in this 
Court's decisions that when the unconstitutionality of par-
ticular state action that is challenged is clear, a federal court 
need not abstain from addressing the constitutional issue 
pending state-court review. See, e. g., Bailey v. Patterson, 
396 U. S. 31, 33 (1962); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 
350, 353 (1962); Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U. S. 241, 251, n. 14. 
See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976). See 
generally Spann, Simple Justice, 73 Geo. L. J. 1041, 1055, 
n. 77 (1985). 7 
T@s, as these cases indicate, if a District Court's ruling 
rest§ sole ~s to the aj)Ifcable rule of law, and 
the f~hed oro no controlling relevance, that _., 
7 This principle finds an analogy in an established doctrine of adminis-
trative law. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943), the Court 
ruled that a reviewing court could not affirm an agency on a principle the 
agency might not embrace. But the ruling in Chenery has not required 
courts to remand in futility. See Illinois v. ICC, 722 F. 2d 1341, 
1348-1349 (CA7 1983); see also Friendly, Chenery Revisited, Reflections 
on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L. J. 199. 
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ruling may be reviewed even though the appeal is from the 
entry of a preliminary injunction. 8 The Court of Appeals in j 
this case properly recognized and applied these principles 
when it observed: 
"Thus, although this appeal arises from a ruling on a re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, we have befo@J!.&_.an 
unusual! complete factual and le arpreseiifation from 
whic to address the im orta t constitutional issues at 
st lie customary discretion accorded to a District 
Court's ruling on a preliminary injunction yields to our 
plenary scope of review as to the applicable law." 737 
F. 2d, at 290. 
That a court of appeals ordinarily will limit its review in a 
case of this kind to abuse of discretion is a rule of orderly ju-
dicial administration, not a limit on judicial power. With a i 
full record before it on the issues now before us, and with the 
intervening decisions in Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos at 
hand, the Court of Appeals was justified in proceeding to ple-
nary review of those issues .. 
IV 
This case, as it comes to us, concerns the constitutionality 
of six r>rovisio.ns of the Pennsylvania Act which the ourt of 
Appeals struck down as facially invalid: § 3205 informed 
8 A different situation is presented, of course, when there is no dis-
agreement as to the law, but the probability of success on the merits de-
pends on facts that are likely to emerge at trial. See Delaware & H. R. 
Co. v. United Transportation Union, 146 U. S.App.D. C. 142, 159, 450 F. 
2d 603, 620, cert. denied, 403 U. S. 911 (1971). 
See also Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research & Development Admin., 528 F. 
2d 1294, 1296 (CA7 1975); California ex rel . Younger v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 516 F . 2d 215, 217 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 868 
(1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 
U. S.App.D. C. 5, 10, 458 F. 2d 827, 832 (1972); Benda v. Grand Lodge, 
584 F. 2d 308, 314 (CA9 1978), cert. dism'd, 441 U. S. 937 (1979); FTC v. 
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consent"); § 3208 ~rinted informati9Jl"); §§ 3214(a) and (h) 
/ (reporting requirements); § 3211(a) '{determination of viabil-
ity); § 3210(b) f<fegree oj care required in postviability abor-
tions); and § 3210(c) '{second-physician requirement). We 
have no reason to address the validity of the other sections of 
the Act challenged in the District Court. 9 
9 No~e: § 3209 (requirement of hospitalization for an abor-
tion suosequent to the first trimester) and § 3205 (24-hour waiting period 
and physician-only counseling-evidently reserved for further litigation); 
§ 3215(e) (compulsory availability of insurance excluding certain abortion 
services-ruled unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals); §§ 3207(b) and 
3214(f) (public disclosure of reports-being the subject of a hearing on a 
renewed motion for injunctive relief); and § 3215(c) (proscription of use of 
public funds for abortion services-being the subject of a separate state-
court action and partially enjoined, see Fischer v. Department of Public 
Welfare, 85 Pa. Commw. 215, 239-240, 482 A. ~d 1137, 1148 (1984), appeal 
pending, 67 M.D. App. Docket (Pa. S. Ct.)). 
Also npt before us currently are: § 3203 (definition of "abortion"), and 
§ 3210(!1) (penalties for abortion after viability, and the "complete defense" 
thereto). 
Remanded for record development or otherwise not invalidated are: 
§ 3206 (parental consent-operation of statute enjoined until promulgation 
of rules by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assuring confidentiality and 
promptness of disposition); § 3207(b) (abortion facilities and reports from 
them for public disclosure); and §§ 3214(c), (d), (f), and (g) (other reporting 
requirements-challenges either not made or withdrawn). 
On June 17, 1985, the District Court, after hearing, preliminarily en-
joined the enforcement of§§ 3207(b) and 3214(:f). Civil Action No. 82-4336 
(ED Pa.). See n. 12, infra. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued the suggested rules, men-
tioned above, on November 26, 1984, after the appeal in this case was 
docketed here. See Pennsylvania Orphan's Court Rules 16.1 to 16.8, re-
printed in 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. following § 794 (Supp. 1985). Appellants 
thereupon filed a motion with the District Court that the injunction against 
enforcement of§ 3206 be vacated. App. 53. That court, however, denied 
the motion, concluding that it had no jurisdiction "to issue the order [appel-
lants] seek" while the case was on appeal here. I d., at 57, 61. We decline 
appellants' suggestion that we now examine this feature of the case in the 
light of the new rules, for we conclude that this development should be con-
sidered by the District Court in the first instance when it concludes that it 
has jurisdiction to do so after our decision today. 
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Less than three years ago, this Court in Akron, Ashcroft, 
and Simopoulos, reviewed challenges to state and municipal 
legislation regulating the performance of abortions. In Ak-
ron, the Court specifically reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
111 (1973). See 462 U. S., at420, 426-431. Again today, as 
noted infra, we reaffirm the general rinci les laid down in l ~ 
Roe and in Akron. ( ---------------In the years since this Court's decision in Roe, States and 
municipalities have adopted a number of measures seemingly 
designed to prevent a woman, with her physician, from ex-
ercising her freedom of choice. Akron is but one example. 
But the constitutional rinci le_s that led this Court to its de-
cisions in 73 st~he compelling reason for rec-
o~izin the constitutional dimeiiSiO'iiSOfaWoman sri ht, to-
gether wi_Ql~i~an, to decide whether to end_ her 
pr~.- ''[I]t shoUld go withoUts eyingthatthev itality 
of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield 
simply because of disagreement wjth them." Brown v. 
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955). The States 
are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or 
potential life, to !!!_ti~te women into continuing pregnan-
cies. Appellants claim that the statutory provisions before 
us today further legitimate compelling interests of the Com-
monwealth. Close analysis of those provisions, however, 
shows that they wh0lry8u5or mate constitutional privacy in-
t~a -~na con erns witli maternal health to the effort to 
deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physi-
cian_J§~ke. --- --
We turn to the challenged statutes: 
1. Section 3205 ("informed consent") and § 3208 (printed 
information). Section 3205(a) requires that the woman give 
her "voluntary and informed consent" to an abortion. Fail-
ure to observe the provisions of § 3205 subjects the physician 
to suspension or revocation of his license, and subjects any 
other person obligated to provide information relating to in-
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formed consent to criminal penalties. § 3205(c). A require- , 
ment that the woman give what is truly a voluntary and in-
formed consent, as a general proposition, is, of course, 
proper and surely is not unconstitutional. See Danforth, 428 
U. S., at 67. But the State may not require the delivery of 
inf~d "to influence the woman's informed 
c~oi~e between abo@n or cblfui}irth." A]Eyn, 462 U. S., at 
443-444. Appellants refer to the Akron ordinance, Brief for 
Appellants 67,asdid this Court in Akron itself, 462 U. S., at 
445, as "a litany of information" and as "a parade of horribles" 
of dubious validity plainly des!_gne_9 to influence the woman's 
choice. They wouldaiSfiilgUisnt~ow­
eW, from the Pennsylvania one. Appellants assert that 
statutes "describing the general subject matter relevant to 
informed consent," ibid., and stating "in general terms the 
information to be disclosed," id., at 447, are permissible, and 
· they further assert that the Pennsylvania statutes do no 
more than that. 
We do not agree. We conclude that, like Akron's ordi-
nance, §§ 3205 and 3208 'fa1l tlie A'fron measurement. The 
twosections prescribe in mr the method for securing "in-
formed consent." Se~nds of information must 
be delivered to the woman a!_~~.L24_bours before her con-
sent is given, and five of these must bvresented by the 
woman's physician. The five are: (a) the name of the physi-
cian who will perform the abortion, (b) the "fact that there 
ma~e det~~~~~<!.psychological effects which 
are notaccurately foreseeable," (c) the "particular medical 
risks associated with the particular abortion procedure to be 
employed," (d) the probable gestational age, and (e) the 
"medical risks associated with carrying · her child to term." 
The remaining two categories are (f) the "fact that medical 
assistance -~s m~ be available for prenatal care; -§_ld-
birtnana neonatal care," and (g) the "fact that the father is 
liab-re-to assist" in the child's support, "even in instances 
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§§ 3205(a)(l) and (2). She also must be informed that materi-
als printed and supplied by the Commonwealth that describe 
the fetus and that list agencies offering alternatives to abor-
tion, are available for her review. If she chooses to review 
the materials but is unable to read, the materials "shall be 
read to her," and any answer she seeks must be "provided 
her in her own language." § 3205(a)(2)(iii). She m~­
tifyJ!.L_w.ri.ting, prior to ~rtion, that ~ll this_b.as peen 
done. § 3205(a)(3). The printed materials "shall include the 
fOllowing statement": 
"There are many public and private agencies willing 
and able to help you to carry your child to term, and to 
assist you and your child after your child is born, 
whether you choose to keep your child or place her or 
him for adoption. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
strongly urges you to contact them before making a final 
decision about abortion. The law requires that your 
physician or his agent give you the opportunity to call 
agencies like these before you undergo an abortion." 
§ 3208(a)(l). 
The materials must describe the "probable anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of'the unborn child at two-week 
gestational increments from fertilization to full term, includ-
ing any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn 
child's survival." § 3208(a)(2). 
In AkronL this Court noted: "The validity of an informed 
consent requirement thus rests on the State's interest in pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman." 462 U. S., at 
443. The Court went on to state: 
"This does not mean, however, that a State has un-
reviewable authority to decide what information a 
woman must be given before she chooses to have an 
abortion. It remains primarily the responsibility of the 
physician to ensure that appropriate information is con-
veyed to his patient, depending on her particular circum-
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stances. Danforth's recognition of the State's interest 
in ensuring that this information be given will not justify 
abortion re 1 ti s esi ed to influence the woman's 
informed choice between abortion or c i b1rth." d., at 
44~
The informational requirements in the Akron ordinance 
were invalid for two "equally decisive" reasons. I d., at 445. 
The first was that "much of the information required is de-
si~ed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to J2er-
suade her to withhold it alto ether." I d., at 444. The sec-
on was rna a rigid requirement that a specific body of 
information be given in all cases, irrespective of the particu-
lar needs of the patient, intrudes upon the discretion of the 
pregnant woman's physician and thereby imposes the "'unde-
sired and uncomfortable straitjacket'" with which the Court 
in Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67, n. 8, was concerned. 
These two reasons apply with equal and controlling force to 
the specific and intrusive informational prescriptions of the 
Pennsylvania statutes. The printed materials required by 
§§ 3205 and 3208 seem to us to be nothing less than an out-
right attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message dis-
couraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent 
dialogue between the woman and her physician. The man-
dated description of fetal characteristics at 2-week intervals, 
no matter how objective, is plainly overinclusive. This is not 
medical information that is always relevant to the woman's 
decision, and it may serve only to confuse and punish her and 
to heighten her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical prac-
tice. 10 Even the listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylva-
'° Following this Court's lead in Akron, federal courts consistently have ) 
stricken fetal-description requirements because of their inflammatory im-
pact. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bel-
lotti, 641 F. 2d 1006, 1021-1022 (CAl 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F . 2d 
772, 784 (CA7 1980); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ash-
croft, 655 F . 2d 848, 868 (CA8 1981); Women's Medical Center of Provi-
dence, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1152-1154 (RI 1982). 
84-495--0PINION 
14 THORNBURGH v. AMERICAN COLL. OF OBST. & GYN. 
nia form presents serious problems; it contains names of 
agencies that well may be out of step with the needs of the 
particular woman and thus places the physician in an awk-
ward position and infringes upon his or her professional 
responsibilities. Forcing the physician or counselor to 
present the materials and the list to the woman makes him or 
her in effect an agent of the State in treating the woman and 
places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the 
list. See Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1154 (RI 1982). All this is, or 
comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the 
wo~essionarmecncal idance she seeks, and 
it Officially s ructures-as it obviously was mtended to do-
the dialogue between the woman and her physician. 
The requirements of§§ 3205(a)(2)(i) and (ii) that the woman 
be advised of the possible availability of medical assistance 
benefits, and that the father is responsible for financial as-
sistance in the support of the child similarly are po~lz dis- 5 
guised elements of discotira ement for the abortion ecision. ~ 
Mucn of this wou e nonmedica information beyon the 
physician's area of expertise and, for man a · s, would 
be irre evant ~opnate. For a patient with a life-
threatenmgpregnancy, the "information" in its very rendi-
tion may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-pa-
tient relationship. As any experienced social worker or 
other counsellor knows, theoretical financial responsibility 
often does not e uate with 'fulfillment. And a victim of rape r 
shou d not have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified 
perpetrator is liable for support if she continues the preg-
nancy to term. Under the guise of informed consent, the 
Act requires the dissemination of information that is not rele-
vant to such consent, and, thus, it advances no legitimate 
state interest. 
The requirements of §§ 3205(a)(l)(ii) and (iii) that the 
woman be informed by the physician of "·detrimental physical 
and psychological effects" and of all "particular medical risks" 
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compound the problem of medical attendance, increase the 
patient's anxiety, and intrude upon the physician's exercise of 
proper professional judgment. This type of compelled in-
formation is the antithesis of informed consent. That the 
Commonwealth does not, and surely would not, compel simi-
lar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery or 
of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of 
the statute and its real purpose. · Pennsylvania, like Akron, 
"has gone far beyond merely describing the general subject 
matter relevant to informed consent." Akron, 462 U. S., at 
445. In addition, the Commonwealth would require the phy-
sician to recite its litany "regardless of whether in his judg-
ment the information is relevant to [the patient's] personal 
decision." Ibid. These statutory defects cannot be saved 
by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hear-
ing. Section 3205's informational requiremeJ?.ts therefore 
are facially unconstitutional. 11 
Appellants assert, however, that even if this be so, the 
remedy is to allow the remainder of the statute to be severed 
and become effective. We rule otherwise. The radical dis-
section necessary for this would leave the statute with little 
resemblance to that intended by the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture. We rejected a similar suggestion as to the ordinance in 
Akron, 462 U.S, at 445, n. 37, despite the presence there of a 
broad severability clause. We reach the same conclusion 
here, where no such clause is present, and reject the plea for 
11 In their argument against this conclusion, appellants claim that the 
informational requirements must be held constitutional in the light of this 
Court's summary affirmance in Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U. S. 901 
(1976), of the judgment in Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 
F. Supp. 554 (ED Pa. 1975). That litigation concerned the Common-
wealth's 1974 Abortion Control Act. Its informed-consent provision, how-
ever, did not contain such plainly unconstitutional informational requests 
as those in the current Act, or any physician-only counseling or 24-hour 
waiting-period requirements. The summary affirmance also preceded the 
decision in Akron and, to the extent, if any at all, it might be considered to 
be inconsistent with Akron, the latter, of course, controls. 
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severance. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 
312-313 (1936). 
2. Sections 3214(a) and (h) (reporting) and § 3211(a) (deter-
mi~tion ~214(a)(8), part of the general 
reporting section, incorporates § 3211(a). Section 3211(a) re-
quires the physician to report the basis for his determination 
"that a child1Si10fVlable." It a_E£,lies oruy: aftei.:The first t ri-
me~ required by §§ 3214(a) and (h) is detailed 
;mcrmust include, among other thing(1identification of the 
performing and referring physicians and of the facility or 
agency;Anif~ation as to the woman's p~cal s~ivision 
and St~~idence,1:~e, marit~tus, atnfnumber 
of prio regnancies; th~te ~r last menstrual period 
an t ro a e gestational age;rhe ~s for any judgment 
that a medical emergency exi~ th't-l)asis for any deter-
mination of nonviability; and t~ethod of payment for the 
abortion. The report is to be signed by the attending physi-
cian. § 3214(b). · Despite the fact that § 3214(e)(2) provides 
that such reports "shallllofl)e deemed public records," 
with~ing of the Commonwealth's "Right-to-Know 
Law," Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 65, § 66.1 et seq. (Purdon 1959 and 
Supp. 1985), e~ch report "shall be made available for £Ublic 
inspection and copying with1nl5 days of receipt in a form 
whiCli Will nofreaa to tlledisclosure of the identity of any per-
son filing a report." Similarly, the report of complications, 
required by § 3214(h), "shall be open to public inspection and 
copying." A willful failure to file a report required under 
§ 3214 is "unprofessional conduct" and the noncomplying phy-
sician's license "shall be subject to suspension or revocation." 
§ 3214(i)(1). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. ~forthl 428 
U. S. 52, 80 (1976), we recognized that recordkeeping andre-
porting provisions "that are reasonably directed to the pres-
ervation of maternal health and that properly respect a pa-
tient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible." But the 
reports required under the Act before us today go well be-
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yond the health-related interests that served to justify the 
Missouri reports under consideration in Danforth. Pennsyl-
vania would require, a~ Missouri ~t, information as to 
method of payment, as to the woman's personal history, and 
as to the bases for medical judgments. The Missouri rEmorts 
were to be used "only for statistical purposes." See id., at 
87. 'I'hey were to be maintained in confidence, with the sole 
exception of pubhc hea1th0fncers. In Akron, the Court ex-
plained its holding in Danforth when it said: "The decisive 
factor was that the State met its burden of demonstrating 
that these regulations furthered important health-related 
state concerns." 462 U. S., at 430. 
The required Pennsylvania reports, on the other hand, 
while claimed not to be "public," are available nonetheless to 
the public for copying. Moreover, there is no limitation on 
the use to which the Commonwealth or the public copiers 
may put them. The elements that proved persuasive Jor the 
ruling in Danforth are absent here. The decision to termi-
nate a ~ely private one that must be 
protected in a way that assures anonymity. JUSTICE STE-
VENS, in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Bellotti v. 
B~, 443 U. S. 622 (1979), aptly observed: 
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision 
that the right may be exercised witqout E_ublic scrutiny 
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign 
or other third parties." I d . , at 655. 
The scope of the information required and its availability to 
the public belie any assertions by the Commonwealth that it 
is advancing any legitimate interest. A woman and her phy- i 
sician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abortion 
if there exists a possibility that her decision and her identity 
will become known publicly. Although the statute does not 
specifically require the reporting of the woman's name, the 
amount of information about her and the circumstances under 
which she had an abortion are so detailed that identification is 
likely. Identification is the obvious purpose of these ex-
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treme reporting requirements. 12 The "impermissible limits" 
that Danforth mentioned, see 428 U. S., at 81, and that Mis-
souri approached have been exceeded here. 
We note, as we reach this conclusion, that the Court con-
sistently has refused to allow government to chill the exer-
cise of constitutional rights by requiring disclosure of pro-
tected, but sometimes unpopular, activities. See, e. g., 
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965) (invali-
dating Post Office requirement that addressee affirmatively 
request delivery of "communist" materials in order to receive 
them); Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (strik-
ing down municipal ban on unsigned handbills); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel . Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462-465 (1958) (in-
validating compelled disclosure of NAACP membership list). 
Pe:Rnsylvania's reporting requirements raise the spectre of 
public exposure and harassment of women who choose to ex-
ercise t e1r personal, intensely private, right, with their phy-
sician, to end a pregnancy. Thus, they pose an unacceptable 
danger of deterring the exercise of that right, and must be 
invalidated. 
3. Section 3210(b) (degree of care for postviability abor-
~iQnS.)., and §32~~ls1~~ir  
12 Appellees advise us , see Brief for Appellees 38-39, that they sought in 
the DiStriCt Court a preliminary injunction against the re uirenleiitthat 
the facility identificatiOn rEll?O an e quarterly statistic~ report be l 
made availa ubrc i ection and co ymg, and that on June 17, 1985, 
after full hearing, the District Court entered a prehmmary injunction 
agafriSttFieenfor mentoT1ne8eoUl:illC-msCICisurerequirements. Appel-
lees assert that the record of that hearing s ows a continuous pattern of 
violence and harassment directed against the patients and staff of abortion 
clinics; that the District Court concluded that this would be increased by 
the public disclosure of facility names and quarterly statistical reports; and 
that public disclosure would impose a burden on the woman's right to an 
abortion by heightening her fear and anxiety, and by discouraging her phy-
sician from offering an abortion because, by so doing, he would avoid pres-
sure from anti-abortion forces . That record, of course, is not now before 
us. We need place no reliance upon it and we draw no conclusion from it. 
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fet~viable). Section 3210(b) 13 sets forth B:Yo iD:-
dependent reqmrements for a ostv1a ility abo wn ~irst, 
it demands the exercise of that degree o care "which such 
person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the 
life and health of any unborn child intended to be born and 
not aborted." Second, "the abortion technique employed 
shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for 
the unborn child to be aborted alive unless," in the physi-
cian's good-faith judgment, that technique "would present a 
significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the 
pregnant woman." An intentional, knowing, or reckless vi-
olation of this standard is a felony of the third degree, and 
subjects the violator to the possibility of imprisonment for 
not more than seven years and to a fine of not more than 
$15,000. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101(2) and 1103(3) 
(1983). 
The Court of Appeals ruled that § 3210(b) was unconstitu- C: /-1 ;, 
tional because it re uired a "trade-off" between the woman's 
health and fetal surviVa , and failed to require that maternal 
health be the p'&sician•s aramount co si er ion . --rr37 F. 
2d, at 300, citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 
397-401 (1979) (where Pennsylvania's 1974 Abortion Control 
Act was reviewed). In Colautti, this Court recognized the 
13 Section 3210(b) reads: 
"Every person who performs or induces an abortion after an unborn 
child has been determined to be viable shall exercise that degree of profes-
sional skill, care and diligence which such person would be required to ex-
ercise in order to preserve the life and health of any unborn child intended 
to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be 
that which would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be 
aborted alive unless, in the good faith judgment of the physician, that 
method or technique would present a significantly greater medical risk to 
the life or health of the pregnant woman than would another available 
method or technique and the physician reports the basis for his judgment. 
The potential psychological or emotional impact on the mother of the un-
born child's survival shall not be deemed a medical risk to the mother. 
Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provi-
sions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree." 
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undesir ilit of an "'trade-off' between the woman's health 
and additional percentage pomts of fetal survival." I d., at 
400. 
Appellants do not take any real issue with this proposition. 
See Brief for Appellants 84-86. They argue instead, as did 
the District Court, see 552 F. Supp., at 806-807, that the 
statute's words "significantly greater medical risk" for the 
life or health of the woman do not mean some additional risk 
(in which case unconstitutionality apparently is conceded) but 
only a "meaningfully increased" risk. That interpretation, 
said the District Court, renders the statute constitutional. 
Id., at 807. The~greed, point!_~ out 
that such a readin IS mcon~wit the~~y lan-
gua e an WI h t e egislative inten1.J:_~flected in that lan-
guage; that the adverb "significantly" modifies the risk 
imposed on the woman; that the adverb is "patently not sur-
plusage"; and that the language of the statute "is not suscep-
tible to a construction that does not require the mother to 
bear an increased medical risk in order to save her viable 
fetus." 737 F. 2d, at 300. We agree with the Court of Ap-
peals and therefore find the sta~valid.14 
Sec wn 10 c r mres t at a secon p ysician be 2..,~·"" j i~ /._ • . 
present during an abortion performed when viability is possi- /~_____......... 
ble. The second physician is to "take control of the child and -
14 This makes it unnecessary for us to consider appellees' further argu-
ment that § 3210(b) is void for vagueness. 
15 Section 3210(c) reads: 
"Any person who intends to perform an abortion the method chosen for 
which, in his good faith judgment, does not preclude the possibility of the 
child surviving the abortion, shall arrange for the attendance, in the same 
room in which the abortion is to be completed, of a second physician. Im-
mediately after the complete expulsion or extraction of the child, the sec-
ond physician shall take control of the child and shall provide immediate 
medical care for the child, taking all reasonable steps necessary, in his 
judgment, to preserve the child's life and health. Any person who inten-
tionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions of this subsection 
commits a felony of the third degree." 
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... provide immediate medical care for the child, taking all 
reasonable steps necessary, in his judgment, to preserve the 
child's life and health." Violation of this requirement is a fel-
ony of the third degree. 
In Planned Parenthood Assn. v. ~' 462 U.S. 476 
~the Court, by a 5-4 vote, b~_§in­
~on, ruled that a Missouri statute requirin the res-
ence of a secon physician uring an abortion erformed after 
via£~. USTICE POWEL_h joined by 
THE-cHIEF JUSTICE, co~te had_a com..Pel-
lin interest in rotecting the life of a viable fetus al}Q.Jhat 
the second 'cian's resence provided assurance tha the 
Stat~ interest was protecte more ftillYJh_an wit!l onl:;: one 
physician in attendance. I d., at 482-486. 16 JusTICE Pow-
ELL ~hat, to pass constitutional muster, the stat-
ute must containan exce tion for the situation where the 
heath of the mother was ~dan~ere y e ay in the arrival 
of tlle secOriCf'i)hYsician. Recognizing that there was "no 
clearly expressed exception" on the face of the Missouri stat-
ute for the emergency situation, JusTICE PowELL found the 
exception implicit in the statutory requirement that action be 
taken to preserve the fetus "provided it does not pose an in-
creased risk to the life or health of the woman." !d., at 485, 
n. 8. 
Like the Missouri statute, § 3210(c) of the Pennsylvania 
statute contains no express exception for an emergency situa-
tion. While the Missouri statute, in the view of JUSTICE 
POWELL, w~ently tQ...imRl;y- an emergency ex-
~RtiEn, Pennsylvan1a's statute contains no such comforting 
or helpful language ana evinces no intent to protect a woman 
w~ay be at risk. Section 3210(a) 17 provides only a 
'
6 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICES WHITE and REHNQUIST, 
stated somewhat cate orically that the second- hysician requirement was 
constitutional. 462 U. . , a 05. 
'
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defense to criminal liability for a physician who concluded, in 
good faith, that a fetus was nonviable "or that the abortion 
was necessary to preserve maternal life or health." It does 
not relate to the second-physician requirement and its words 
are not words of emergency. 
It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how to 
provide a medical-emer enc e c tion when it chooses to do 
so. It defined " m edical emergency" in general terms in 
§ 3203, and it specifically provided a medical-emergency ex-
ception with respect to informational requirements, § 3205(b); 
for parental consent, § 3206; for post-first trimester hospital-
ization, § 3209; and for a public official's issuance of an order 
for an abortion without the express voluntary consent of the 
woman, § 3215(f). We necessarily conclude that the legisla-
ture's failure to rovi~~tion in 
§ 3210(c) was in~l. All the factors are here for chilling 
the performance of a late abortion, which, more than one per-
formed at an earlier date, perhaps tends to be under emer-
. gency conditions. 
v 
Although appellants challenge the merits of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision solely on the ground that the Court of Appeals 
misapplied Roe v. Wade and its successors, the Solicitor Gen-
eral, appearing on behalf of the United States as amicus cu-
riae in support of appellants, urges that we take this occasion 
to overrule those cases entirely. For the Solicitor General 
to ask us to discard a line of major constitutional rulings in a 
case where no party has made a similar request is, to say the 
least, unusual. We decline his invitation. 
"Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly performs or in-
duces an abortion when the fetus is viable commits a felony of the third 
degree. It shall be a complete defense to any charge brought against a 
physician for violating the requirements of this section that he had con-
cluded in good faith, in his best medical judgment, that the unborn child 
was not viable at the time the abortion was performed or induced or that 
the abortion was necessary to preserve maternal life or health." 
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We concluded in Akron that there are "especially compel-
ling reasons" for adhering to the principles of Roe: 
"That case was considered with special care. It was 
first argued during the 1971 Term, and reargued-with 
extensive briefing-the following Term. The decision 
was joined by THE CHIEF JusTICE and six other Jus-
tices. Since Roe was decided in January 1973, the 
Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and ap-
plied the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental 
right to make a highly personal choice whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy" (citing cases). 462 U. S., at 
420, n. 1. 
The Solicitor General notes that our holding in Roe has re-
quired courts to draw difficult lines. With this observation 
we agree, although it does not lead us to the Solicitor Gener-
al's conclusion. Constitutional rights do not always have 
easily ascertainable boundaries, and controversy over the 
meaning of our Nation's most majestic guarantees frequently . 
has been turbulent. As judges, however, we are sworn to ..,.._. • .J ... 
uphold the law even when its content gives rise t~~~ 
pute. WerecognizedinRoe, 410U. S., at 116 esub-1 · 
ject of abortion raises moral and spiritual questions over 
which honorable persons can disagree sincerely and pro-
foundly. But those disagreements did not then and do not 
now relieve us of our duty to apply the Constitution faith-
fully. We held in Roe, and we reaffirm today, that a wom-
an's decision, made with her physician, whether t9f!91Itina:e ~ 
her pregnancy is among those decisions so personal and so in-
timate that th~y may be regulated only as strictly necessary 
to protect compelling state interests. 
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
bodies a substantive promise that a certain private sphere of 
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of 
government. See, e. g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). That promise extends to 
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all persons, women as well as men. Few decisions are more 
personal, more properly private, or more basic to individual 
dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision, with the 
guidance of her physician, whether to end her pregnancy. A 
woman's right to make such a choice freely is fundamental. 
Any other result, in our view r would protect inadequately a 
central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees 
equally to all. 
The Court of Appeals correctly invalidated the specified 
provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act. Its 
judgment is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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